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Commercial Policy Uncertainty, the Expected Cost of
Protection, and Market Access
Abstract:  Protection unconstrained by rules often varies substantially over time.
Rules-based disciplines like OECD industrial tariff bindings negotiated under
GATT since 1947 and new Uruguay Round bindings on agricultural and services
trade and on developing country industrial tariffs, constrain this variability. We
examine the theoretical effects of such constraints on the expected cost of
protection and offer a formalization of the concept of “market access,”
emphasizing both the first and second moments of the distribution of protection.
As an illustration, we provide a stylized examination of Uruguay Round agricultural
bindings.
I.  Introduction
Historically, rates of protection have varied substantially over time.  In the much-studied case of protection of
industrial products in developed countries, this variability has been greatly diminished as a result of the
progressive lowering of multilaterally agreed tariffs.  For example, U.S. tariffs averaged 40 percent in the
nineteenth century, while ranging between 20 percent and 60 percent over the period.  In the first half of the
twentieth century, U.S. tariffs followed a similar pattern, ranging from a low of approximately 20 percent to a
high of 60 percent of dutiable value.  Since the establishment of GATT in 1947, average U.S. tariffs have fallen
to less than 5 percent, while the variance of individual bound tariffs has been virtually eliminated.1 However,
the stochastic nature of protection has remained strongly evident across individual sectors and instruments free
from, or lightly constrained by, multilateral trade rules. Thus, protection rates have varied substantially in areas
such as agriculture (in both developed and developing countries) and in industrial products in developing
countries.  When we look beyond bound tariffs on industrial goods, we find that a wide range of measures such
as variable levies, import quotas, voluntary export restraints (VERs), import surcharges, and the various forms
of contingent protection (such as balance of payments actions, safeguard actions, anti-dumping and
countervailing duties) continues to be used to generate time-varying rates of protection.
During the Uruguay Round, the coverage of multilateral trade rules was increased substantially.  The
coverage of tariff bindings was greatly expanded, with the coverage of bindings on agricultural commodities
increasing to almost 100 percent.  There were also large increases in the proportions of industrial product
imports into developing countries covered by bindings. In addition, completely new disciplines were introduced
                                                  
1 Caves, Frankel, and Jones (1993, Chapter 14).  Changes in bound U.S. tariffs outside the scope of multilateral and
bilateral liberalization exercises have become a relatively rare event.   They are usually made in the context of
disputes over negotiated tariff concessions.   This includes the U.S. duty on light trucks, increased in a dispute with
Germany in the 1960s.  Tariffs on countries outside the GATT system of most-favoured nation (mfn) tariff
bindings, like U.S. duties on imports from China, remain subject to movements induced by political winds,
including the threatened imposition of non-mfn (Smoot-Hawley) rates.
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for trade in services and trade-related investment measures.  However, while the range of trade covered by
bindings has expanded, many of the new tariff bindings introduced by the Uruguay Round agreements
represent relatively loose constraints on policy, being set at or above the currently applied rates of protection.
To analyze the effects of these measures requires techniques that have not been widely used by trade policy
analysts.
Trade negotiators have long recognized the importance of tariff bindings in an otherwise uncertain
world, and the introduction of constraints on countries’ trade policies is at the heart of the multilateral trading
system.  The very structure of market access commitments under the GATT is centered on the concept of
bindings.  In policy discussions of market access, special emphasis is often placed on the perceived benefits of
reductions in the uncertainty confronting exporters regarding commercial policy.  This is manifested in trade
negotiations, where negotiating credit is given even for tariff bindings at or above initial applied rates. Yet,
economists have given relatively little attention to formal evaluation of the benefits of tariff bindings and other
commitments in the context of time-varying underlying protection processes.2  Our objectives in this paper are
twofold: to push our notion of protection and trade liberalization further away from one based primarily on
fixed policy instruments, and closer to one that involves policy regimes subject to uncertainty and variability;
and to offer a relatively simple analytical framework for examination of the implications of rules-based
commitments in this context.
We start with a very brief overview of the recent political economy literature on the determinants of
protection. The goal of this section is not the choice of a particular political submodel, but rather the motivation
of our characterization of trade policy as subject to uncertainty. In our view, this body of literature provides a
rather convincing rationale for treating the rate of protection as inherently uncertain. We then examine the
impact of policy rules on the first and second moments of the intertemporal distribution of rates of protection. 
This is followed by an evaluation of the consequences of changes in these moments for the expected cost of
protection in own markets, and for the conditions of market access in export markets. A simple stylized
examination of Uruguay Round agricultural bindings is then provided as illustration.
II.  Characterizing the distribution of protection
A major thrust of trade policy research in recent decades has been the development of political economy
models to represent the process of trade policy formulation. These models specify national trade policy
                                                  
2 The literature on trade under uncertainty emphasizes stochastic disturbances in preferences or technology.   See,
for example, Helpman and Razin (1978), Pomery (1984), and Falvery and Lloyd (1991).  With the notable recent
exceptions of Stockman and Dellas (1986), Barari and Lapan (1993), who examine asset markets under tariff
uncertainty,  and Stahl and Turunen-Red (1995), who examine tariff games, the formal implications of stochastic
tariff regimes remain relatively unexplored.  The formal literature on trade rules and institutions focuses instead on
rules in the context of tariff games between governments.  (In this regard, see the excellent survey by Staiger
1996).
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measures as being determined by a set of time-varying explanatory variables operating through a political
process, which introduces a wide range of additional shocks to protection rates. While the emphasis of this
literature has been on explaining the level of protection at any time, it seems clear to us that the models used
imply that unrestrained protection will typically be subject to uncertainty. Our goal in this section is not to offer
a preferred political economy model of uncertainty in the level of protection, but rather to argue that the
existing body literature provides rational for expecting the reduced form representation of protection from such
processes to be subject to uncertainty. 3
One set of explanations for variations in rates of protection across industries and over time is inspired
by the work of Olson (1965) and Stigler (1974), and focuses on factors such as the structure of the industry, its
consequent costs of organization, and lobbying success. Another set of explanations surveyed by Dornbusch
and Frankel (1987) emphasizes the role of macroeconomic shocks. A third set of models considers in more
depth the nature of the political decision making system which generates protection decisions (see Magee,
Brock and Young, 1989) and introduces shocks from random political outcomes. Yet another approach
emphasizes the role of past and present shocks to import levels. Finally, the choice of protective instrument will
reflect the preferences of decision makers regarding the volatility of protection, and this choice will introduce an
additional random element into the behavior of protection.
Anderson (1978, 1980) draws on the theoretical work of Olson and Stigler to explain differences in
protection levels across industries in terms of a range of predetermined variables, including the number of
firms, the size of the industry, the industry’s net trade position, the labor intensity of the production process,
and its geographical concentration (which influences its political strength). Gardner (1987) draws on similar
literature to explain differences in agricultural protection both across industries and over time.  In such a
conceptual framework, variations in “predetermined ” variables, like the net trade position of an industry and
industry size and health, can generate consequent swings in protection.
Dornbusch and Frankel (1987) offer models of protectionist pressures based on highly variable
macroeconomic influences such as the real exchange rate, the real interest rate and the rate of unemployment.
Ray (1987) provides other evidence linking protection to unemployment and recessions, Hanson (1990), and
Bohara and Kaempfer (1991). The variables that generate changes in protection in these models are random,
and are augmented by other random influences not captured in the models.  Again, such linkages suggest that
medium- and long-run swings in the macroeconomic environment may also generate swings in protection at
the industry level.  In the context of developing countries, Rodrik (1994) emphasizes the importance of tariffs
as a source of government revenue.  This provides a direct link between macroeconomic conditions and
government incentives for applying tariffs.
                                                  
3 See Rodrik (1986, 1994), and also Nelson (1994), for discussion of this literature.
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We also know that tariff levels are positively correlated with import levels (Leamer, 1988), which in
turn are variable and subject to movements in exchange rates and macroeconomic conditions.4 In terms of
quotas, Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1976) offer a theoretical example where the level of imports in one period
determines the probability of an import quota in the next.  The threat of such protection reduces the (optimal)
incentives for export from the point of view of the exporting country.   One can imagine the level of import
penetration, in various permutations of such a framework, as depending on exchange rate swings, the business
cycle, or a number of other factors. The more recent theoretical literature (Baldwin 1989; Magee, Brock and
Young, 1989; and Hillman, 1982) also links protection, in its various guises, with increased import penetration.
 In particular, increased penetration leads to intensified lobbying for protection.  Trefler (1993) offers evidence
that the application of NTBs in the United States is correlated with changes in the level of import penetration. 
In Trefler's results, it is changing (i.e. variable) market conditions and not the level of import penetration per se,
that leads to increases in protection.
The political processes highlighted in models emphasizing the political lobbying process (see, for
example, Magee, Brock and Young, 1989) introduce additional sources of randomness into the determination
of protection policies. Voters’ views of protection vary through time, as does the extent to which politicians
supply the trade policies they promise.  The possibility of voter retribution in cases of nonperformance
introduces further variability into the trade policy process.
The form of protection chosen may have an important impact on the variability of protection. While
ad valorem tariffs maintain a fixed relativity between domestic and world prices, this is not the case with
virtually any other form of protection. Specific tariffs can lead to very large changes in relative prices.
Crucini (1994) finds that the use of specific tariffs was much more important than the Hawley-Smoot Act
in raising US tariff rates during the 1930s. Protective instruments such as import quotas and variable
import levies can have similarly dramatic impacts on relative prices for particular commodities. As
emphasized by Vousden (1990, p70), the choice of protective instrument is not arbitrary. It is likely to be
influenced by its impact on the mean and variability of the incomes of various groups. In turn, this
choice will influence the variability of protection rates.
Uncertainty (and hence intertemporal variability) in the rate of protection is particularly marked in
import monitoring and administered protection regimes such as those imposed where dumping is alleged. 
Winters (1994) finds that import surveillance, in the case of the European Union, can have a significant
dampening effect on trade. Tollefsen (1994) notes that, as a group, VERs and monitoring mechanisms are the
                                                  
4 For example, the round of trade activism in trade-sensitive sectors in the United States in the mid 1980s, during a
period with a soaring dollar and massive capital inflows, could be characterized as one of microeconomic triage for
macroeconomic imbalances.  The demand for protection can be responsive to swings in conditions well beyond
those related to the immediate workings of particular sectors and their respective agents.
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most common form of nontariff barrier (NTB) protection applied in the industrial countries. Both are a
common outcome of threatened or suspended antidumping and countervailing duty actions. 
While EC antidumping cases are more frequently settled by price undertakings and associated
monitoring mechanisms (Hindley, 1990), U.S. practice in this area can take a similar tack, as evidenced by the
U.S. export restraint arrangements on bearings from Japan and uranium from the FSU republics. Hindley
postulates that, given the administrative uncertainly inherent in the U.S. system, there is an incentive for
exporters to the United States to raise their prices on products not covered by antidumping duties, simply to
reduce the probability of an investigation.  Similar incentives exist to accept "voluntary" restraint arrangements
under the threat of AD actions.  In addition to administrative uncertainty, Feinberg (1989) links findings of
dumping to swings in exchange rates, while Feinberg and Hirsch (1989)  link such findings in downstream
industries to the imposition of protection in upstream sectors. 
Under the system of administrative reviews and revision to dumping duties used in the United States,
existing dumping orders themselves serve as a type of monitoring mechanism. This mechanism may have a
significant effect, even when bond requirements are below one percent. Boltuck, Francois, and Kaplan (1990)
offer empirical evidence related to the outcome of administrative reviews. Because dumping duties in the
United States are initially levied as bonds, with the actual duty rates determined long after the actual entry of
imports, the ex ante variance in the duty-inclusive price of imports subject to bonding requirements can be quite
large, introducing yet another stochastic component to the observed rate of  protection.
Whichever model, or combination of models, is chosen to characterize the ex ante distribution of
protection, it seems clear that protection rates for individual commodities should be characterized not merely by
a single deterministic value, but as the outcome of an inherently stochastic process characterized by a mean
value and one or more higher moments.
III.     Rules as limits on protection
Born out of the experience of escalating tariffs in the period between the two world wars, the multilateral
trading system is a set of rules which restricts the damage that governments can impose through unbridled use
of the range of policy instruments otherwise available to them.  In most cases, multilateral trade rules do not
prescribe precisely what countries must do.  Rather, they tend to operate by imposing limits on the values and
types of protection which are allowed, and by forcing a degree of transparency onto trade regimes.  Like
Ulysses tied to the mast, governments are then able to listen to the siren call of protectionist lobbies, while
pleading an ability to actually respond.  Tariffs are prohibited from varying across suppliers by most-favored-
nation (mfn) requirements and their variation over time is limited by tariff bindings.  The application of certain
quotas is limited, or even prohibited, by the Uruguay Round Agreements.  Contingent protection, through fair
trade and safeguard actions, is in theory limited by related GATT disciplines as well. Other rules apply to
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balance-of-payments actions, licensing requirements, and trade-related investment measures.  In the Uruguay
Round,  market access bindings were also introduced for the service sectors.
Countries offering tariff bindings do not generally specify the tariff rate that they will actually apply.
Instead, they commit themselves to tariff rates not exceeding the bound rate. Bindings are vital to the process
of securing trade agreements. If an agreed tariff reduction could be unilaterally reversed, any liberalization offer
would have to be weighed against the probability of backsliding. Exporting firms, which provide much of the
political support for multilateral trade liberalization, are likely to be unenthusiastic about tariff cuts they expect
to be short-lived. Bindings themselves are considered to be so important that countries agreeing to bind
previously unbound tariffs are given "negotiating credit" for the decision.  This is true even if the tariff is bound
above the currently applied level.
Mexico provides a recent example of ceiling bindings that limit future increases in protection.  The
overall pattern of tariffs, for the period spanning from 1982-1991, is presented in Table 1.  The level of tariffs
in the table reflects an episode of liberalization following Mexico’s 1982 financial crisis.  As part of Mexico’s
accession to the GATT in 1986, Mexico agreed to bind its entire tariff schedule, including both industrial and
agricultural products, at a 50 percent ad valorem rate.5  In the year prior to accession (1985), the average tariff
was 18.5 percent.  However, while the average tariff in 1985 was 18.5 percent, some products were dutied at
rates of up to 100 percent.  The average tariff on consumer goods in the year prior to GATT accession was 45
percent.  Even since accession, Mexico’s average tariffs have ranged between 4.0 percent and 13.1 percent.  A
further cap on tariffs was imposed by Mexico’s entry into the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).  From 1967 to 1990, the aggregate U.S. and Canadian share of Mexican imports has hovered
around 65 percent.  The combined effects of GATT accession and the NAFTA has been to significantly limit
Mexico’s scope for raising trade barriers through tariffs, and has placed caps that, though often above current
rates, are well below the historically observed peak rates.   (Francois 1997).
Tariffs are not the only measures that can be bound. For agricultural products, bindings include
commitments on subsidies granted to exported products or to volumes exported with the aid of subsidies, and
on internal support to agricultural producers.  In the case of services, where obstacles to trade are not centered
on border measures, countries have bound the level of market access and national treatment for sectors listed in
their respective schedules, meaning that no new measures affecting entry and operation in the market may be
imposed with respect to four modes of supplying a service (cross-border, consumption abroad, commercial
presence, and movement of personnel).
To ensure the credibility of these commitments, it is necessary to limit the remaining set of available
instruments as well.  Under GATT 1994, the limitations on industrial quotas accomplish part of this.  The
                                                  
5 The exception was any imports already covered by lower bindings.  Mexico also negotiated quotas were also
negotiated for certain products (primarily agricultural and wood-based products) under bound rates.  See
GATT(1993).
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Uruguay Round Agreement on Safeguards requires the abolition of VERs, orderly marketing arrangements or
any similar measures on the export or the import side, and places further limits on GATT-legal contingent
protection. In theory, this includes notification requirements for the introduction of new quotas under the
safeguards provisions (Article XIX). The Agreement also applies a "sunset clause" to all safeguard actions and
sets out requirements for safeguard investigations.  The Agreement on Implementation of Article VI
(antidumping) clarifies many aspects of the rules governing the application of anti-dumping measures. Whether
these rules actually constrain protection outcomes remains to be seen, however (see Finger, 1996).
IV.     The effect of binding rules on the observed distribution of protection
In this section, we develop a formal (and admittedly stylized) representation of rules-based bindings on trade
policy.  For clarity of exposition, we limit ourselves to a single instrument operating as a tariff.  Though we limit
ourselves to a price-based instrument, other rules-based constraints on protection can be analyzed, qualitatively,
 in a similar way.  
We begin by representing the underlying distribution of protection in the absence of a tariff binding by
a distribution such as that depicted in Figure 1. In general terms, we motivate our representation by the
determinants of uncertainty in protection discussed in the previous section. In this context, there are numerous
political models that can be invoked here to drive the underlying probabilities related to a particular government
orientation toward trade.  (See, for example, Stahl and Turinen-Red).   What is important for the present
discussion is not the choice of a particular political submodel, but rather the resulting characterization of trade
policy as subject to uncertainty. Formally, therefore, we simply assume that the expected level of the tariff is m0
in the absence of a binding on the tariff rate applied, and the distribution of protection can be characterized by
a relatively small number of  moments. 
Now consider the introduction of a tariff binding at rate b.  By definition, such a binding rules out all
tariff rates above b. If the underlying probability distribution does not change, then all of the probability mass
formerly associated with applied tariffs equal to or above b is mapped onto tariff rate b. The resulting
distribution of tariffs is a winsorized distribution consisting of a truncated distribution of tariff rates up to the
binding, and a "spike" at the bound rate, b. With the binding, the expected rate of protection will decline to a
point like µ1, and its variability will decrease. The effect of a binding at any given level above µ0 on the mean of
the protection process will be greater the larger is the variance of the protection process.
The effect of a tariff binding on the mean of the protection rate can be evaluated by calculating the
expected tariff rate in the presence of a binding and comparing it with the mean of the unconstrained
distribution of protection. Adapting the approach used by Martin and Urban (1984) to analyze the effects of
support prices, we obtain the following expression for the mean tariff equivalent in the presence of the binding.
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where m1 is the mean of the new distribution where tariffs are constrained by the binding; t is the tariff rate; and
f, which may be conditional on the exogenous factors suggested in the literature, is the density function of
the tariff rate.6
Because b is a constant, equation (1) may be simplified to:
where F(t) is the distribution (cumulative density) function of the tariff rate.
If the distribution of the tariff rate can be approximated by a normal distribution, and if the
distribution assumed to be invariant with respect to the imposition of a binding, the mean of the tariff can be
expressed in normalized form (mZ) as:
where Z = (t-m0)/s0 , is simply the normalized tariff rate, defined by calculating the deviation of the tariff rate
from its unbound mean and dividing by s0, the standard deviation of the original distribution, and where Z* =
(b-m0)/s0 is the value of the normalized tariff binding.  Similar expressions can be derived for alternative
functional distributions.
In more general terms, rearranging equation (2) gives us the following general expression for the long-
run mean of the tariff following the introduction of a binding:
From the structure of the expression, it is clear that m1 must be less than the mean of the unbound
tariff, m 0. The relationship between the mean subject to binding (m 1), and the unbound mean (m 0) is a
nonlinear one, implying that the expected tariff cannot change one for one with the binding, as is frequently
                                                  
6Alternative approaches for this type of problem have been suggested by Fraser (1988) who derived the mean price
by mixing the two distributions, and by Bardsley and Cashin (1990), who applied option pricing theory.
 (1) ttbtttm
b
b
)df+)d.f(=
0
1 (×òò
¥
(2) ))F(-.(1+)d.f(=
0
1 bbtttm
b
ò
(3) Z
-
1
2
(Z 2) * *= 1
2 e Z
(1- F(Z ))m p
* +
(4) ttbtttmttbtmm
bbb
)df()df()df(=1 òòò
¥¥¥
+-=-- )()( 00
-9-
assumed in the applied literature.  For b well below m0, F(b) (the probability mass to the left of b) will be
relatively close to zero and so m1 will essentially decline one for one with reductions in the tariff binding. At
higher bound rates, the marginal effect of a reduction in the tariff binding will be much less than unity.
Importantly, however, the marginal effect of a change in a tariff binding does not change abruptly when the
binding passes through the mean tariff rate, but rather declines monotonically with increases in the distribution
function.  This contrasts sharply with the deterministic case where changes in the binding have a unit impact
below the applied rate and a zero impact at all values above the applied rate.  For very high values of b, the
marginal impact of a change in the binding approaches zero, giving the common-sense conclusion that
marginal changes in the binding about very high levels have essentially no effect on the  expected value of the
tariff.  Another way of interpreting equation (4) is in terms of the amount of probability mass accumulated at
the binding. A marginal reduction in b has a one for one impact on the protection rate associated with the
probability mass accumulated at that point. The impact of the change on the mean rate of protection depends
upon the amount of probability mass accumulated at the binding, that is on (1-F(b))= ò
¥
b
tt df )( .
If we take the average tariff rates on industrial products prior to the first post-war GATT Round as
indicative of the underlying mean rate of protection on industrial products in developed countries, then this
would imply an underlying average tariff rate of 40-50 percent (Preeg 1994). With average industrial tariffs in
the developed countries reduced to only six percent after the Tokyo Round, and 3.5 percent with the Uruguay
Round, it seems likely that F(Z*) was effectively zero from a policy viewpoint, implying that incremental
reductions in industrial tariff bindings in the OECD (which by the end of the Tokyo Round were virtually all
equal to the applied rates) had essentially a unit impact on expected future tariff rates. This is consistent with
the approach used in quantitative studies of the Tokyo (see, for example, Deardorff and Stern, 1986), where
reductions in bindings were treated as leading to one-for-one reductions in protection. To extrapolate such an
approach to Preeg's "brave new world" of the Uruguay Round agreement seems hazardous-- particularly since
it involves bindings at or above previous levels of protection in many areas, and particularly in the agriculture
agreement (Hathaway and Ingco, 1996).
The effect of a binding on the variance of the distribution can be evaluated using similar procedures to
those adopted for the mean. We first write the general expression for the post-winsorization variance of a
standardized variable (Freund and Walpole 1980):
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The variance of the standardized distribution of protection in the presence of a binding is then given by:
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The marginal impact of a binding on the variance of protection can be derived in the same way as the
impact of the binding on the mean. By differentiating equation (7) and rearranging the results, we find that:
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From equation (8), it is clear that the marginal impact of a change in a tariff binding on the variance may be
considerably different from the impact on the mean. For values considerably above the underlying mean of the
unfettered distribution, the impact of a change in the binding on the variance is very small for the same reason
that the impact on the mean is small: because (1-F(Z*)) approaches zero. This result reflects the intuition that
small changes in bindings that are so high as to be irrelevant for practical policy purposes have very little impact
on either the mean or the variability of the distribution. An important difference arises when we consider
changes in bindings well below the underlying mean of the distribution. In this case, the binding approaches the
mean of the winsorized distribution. Accordingly,  (b-m 1  ) approaches zero and the marginal impact of the
binding on the variance of the distribution approaches zero -- even though the marginal impact on the mean is
at its maximum in this situation.  Here, virtually all of the probability distribution is collected at the binding and
marginal reductions in the binding have very little further impact on the variance of protection.
V.     The welfare implications of commercial policy uncertainty
We next turn to a general equilibrium representation of the welfare effects of protection.  Our emphasis
in this section is on protection in import markets (i.e. own protection).  However, this will be extended to
a more general representation of market access uncertainty (i.e. protection by trading partners as well) in
the next section.  For clarity of exposition, we continue with our focus on a single price-based
instrument.
A convenient approach to evaluating the welfare impacts of protection in general equilibrium is
the Balance of Trade function (Lloyd and Schweinberger 1988; Anderson and Neary 1992; Martin 1995).
Under this approach, a money measure of the change in welfare resulting from a tariff is obtained by
evaluating the change in the balance of trade necessary to maintain constant utility (i.e. the net transfer
needed to maintain welfare), given a change in a policy.  A policy distortion that reduces domestic
efficiency increases the costs of achieving a given level of utility, and requires a transfer from the rest of
the world to maintain that utility level.  As will become evident, for individual product markets, more
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generally for standard 2 good models, and alternatively for the stylized representation of exports and
imports by composite goods, this approach can be used to illustrate general equilibrium welfare effects
through familiar geometric tools normally associated with partial equilibrium models.  (See Martin 1997;
Francois and Hall 1997). 
We start by defining general equilibrium for a small country in terms of dual expenditure and
revenue functions.  The value of output is defined by the function g( p, v), and the expenditure function
by e( p, u ):
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In equations (9) and (10),  e(p,u) is the expenditure required to achieve the level of utility u at the vector of
domestic, distorted prices p, and g(p,v) is the gdp function indicating the maximum production revenue
which can be generated with resource endowments v at domestic prices p. The vector of domestic
demands for output is given by the first derivative of e(p,u) with respect to p,  while domestic supplies are
represented by gp. The gap between the domestic and the world price, (p-p*), is the tariff on imports, so
that tariff revenues are given by (ep - gp)(p - p*).  The balance of trade function for an economy subject only
to trade distortions is then defined as:
(11) B e p u g p v e g p pp p= - - - -( , ) ( , ) ( )( )
*
For notational simplicity, it is convenient to rewrite (11) in terms of the net revenue function
z(p,u,v)=e(p,u)-g(p,v) and its derivatives. Thus:
(12) B z p u v z p pp= - -( , , ) ( )( )
*
To consider the effect of discrete changes in protection on the balance of trade function, it is
convenient to use a second-order Taylor Series expansion.  Assuming linearity of the excess demand curve, zp ,
so that third derivatives vanish, this yields the following expression for the welfare effects of any change in a
tariff:
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To evaluate the expected costs of a single tariff subject to uncertainty, we evaluate (13) about a zero-tariff initial
equilibrium, and take expectations to obtain:
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where the first term on the right hand side of (13) disappears because the tariff was initially zero; D p can be
replaced by t  = (p - p*) following the introduction of the tariff;  and where m t   and st2 are the mean and
variance of the tariff.
From (14), we can see that our general equilibrium measure of the cost of protection on imports,
relative to a free trade benchmark where (p-p*)=0, is determined by the second moment of the tariff about
the origin, E(t )2 , multiplied by 1/2 times the slope of the compensated import demand curve, zpp. Since
the second moment about the origin is equal to the sum of the mean squared and the variance, this
implies that the expected cost of protection is given by the square of the mean tariff plus the variance of
the tariff, all multiplied by one half the (absolute) slope of the compensated excess demand curve. 
Clearly, this implies that absolute reductions in the variance of protection and in the mean-squared rate of
protection have the same qualitative impact on the costs of protection.
VI. The gains from improved market access
A. import protection
We next turn to a geometric representation of the welfare implications of bindings on import
protection.  Equation (14) can be given a graphical interpretation using Figure 2, which depicts the
compensated import demand curve, zp.  If we first consider the case of a deterministic tariff of (p-p*), then
our general equilibrium welfare measure is approximated by the Harberger triangle cab under the excess
demand curve in Figure 2. This area is equal to -1/2.zpp(p-p*)2.  To illustrate the nature of the higher costs
associated with variable protection,  consider symmetric variations around this tariff level, with a higher
tariff yielding a higher domestic price of ph in one period, and a lower tariff yielding a lower domestic
price, pl in another time period. In Figure 2, the higher tariff has a welfare cost represented by area cfg,
while the cost of the lower tariff is represented by area cde. Clearly, the average cost associated with the
varying protection is greater than area cab associated with the same average rate of protection. This
asymmetry is a manifestation of  the convexity of equation (14) in the tariff rate.
-13-
Traditional analysis of the welfare effects of a tariff is based on the assumption that a tariff
remains fixed, such that the variance term in equation (12) is zero. Under this assumption, equation (14)
collapses to:
(15)
D B z zp p p p= - = -
1
2
1
2
2 2t m t
Comparison of equations (14) and (15) makes it clear that the basic element missing under the assumption of a
fixed rate of protection is the variance term, which maps directly into the welfare impact of protection.
Equation (14) provides a formal representation of the concept of market security so much emphasized
in qualitative analysis of trade policy.  By combining the impacts of changes in bindings on both the mean and
the variance of protection into a single measure of welfare change, it allows us to provide a quantitative
estimate of the extent to which protection policy restrained by GATT-type disciplines is to be preferred over
protection which is free to vary in an uncontrolled manner.  Early in the liberalization process, when tariff
bindings are generally high relative to the underlying mean of the distribution of protection, the gains from
subjecting protection to multilateral disciplines may be due more to reductions in variability than to reductions
in the mean level of protection. This implies that the near-universal omission of the beneficial impacts of
reductions in the variability of protection in studies of multilateral trade liberalization may have greatly
understated the gains, particularly in the early stages of the process.
The formula for the cost of variable protection given in equation (14) also provides us with a simple
approach to estimate the relative reduction in the cost of protection associated with the introduction of a
binding. This involves estimating the mean and the standard deviation of protection before and after the new
binding. Squaring these and adding them yields the second moment of the rate of protection, t , about zero. 
Note that zpp can be replaced by M0 e   where M0 is the free trade level of imports, e  is the (constant) import
demand elasticity, and free trade prices are normalized to 1.  Taking -1/2.zpp to be a constant, the
proportional reduction in the second moment will give the proportional reduction in the cost of
protection.
If we index the base cost of protection at Io=100, then we can define a welfare-weighted index of
the expected cost of protection as follows:
(16) I E B E B z E p z E ppp pp1 1 0 1
2
0
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We will revisit the possible application of equation (14) in Section VII of this paper.
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B.  improved market access
While as trade economists we often emphasize import protection when subjecting trade liberalization
to our formal analytical tricks, political emphasis during negotiations is actually placed on protection in export
markets.  Improved market access, which to exporters means more restrictive bindings on protection in export
markets, is the price demanded by governments for own-liberalization.  This follows, in part, from the
willingness of individual exporters to back initiatives that involve improved access to their export markets.7 
This is not the end of the story, however.  We should also expect reduced uncertainty about trading conditions
in export markets to have welfare implications for the economy as a whole.  In this section, we offer a simple
formal representation of improved market security access in the context of bindings.8 
We start by again assuming a small country.  Its terms of trade are taken as given, and its structure is
again represented by equations (9)-(11).  While the country is small, its trading partners are not, and its terms-of-
trade depend on shifting patterns of protection among those large trading partners.  In terms of equation (12),
we are therefore assuming that p=p*.  We again take a second order Taylor Series expansion of equation (12),
obtaining:
(17) D D DB z p z pp pp= -* ( *)
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2
How do we represent market access in export markets in a stochastic context?  We will assume that
the absence of protection in export markets defines full market access.  Like the case of import protection,
higher degrees of protection in export markets, which mean worse conditions of market access, are assumed to
be characterized by a probability density function.  Basically, with increases in such protection, our small
exporter will register a deterioration in the terms of trade as reflected in P.  We leave it to the reader to verify
that tariff bindings in this context have implications for improvements in the expected terms of market access
similar to the implications for expected rates of home protection.  In the present context, where we are
concerned with economywide welfare implications, market access uncertainty will translates into terms of trade
uncertainty.  Taking expectation of equation (18), we have:
                                                  
7  If one believes that own-liberalization is an important source of welfare gains, then the GATT/WTO can be
viewed as a very successful trick.  By pressing for mutual liberalization in export markets, Member countries are
actually, on net, acting as if they were jointly pursuing import liberalization (as one’s imports is another’s exports). 
Therefore, own liberalization is pressed by the harnessing of mercantilist interests.
8  Of course, one may also expect reduced uncertainty about protection in export markets to also have implications
for the behavior of investors.  We turn to this issue in the concluding section of the paper.
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Where h x is the mean expected deterioration in the terms of  trade, and s x2 is the associated variance term. 
Like equation (14), equation (18) can also be given a graphical interpretation.  Returning to Figure 2,
the second term in equation (18) again relates to the expected value of the welfare triangle in the figure.  The
critical difference is the first term, which does not appear in equation (14).  This term measures the expected
value of the relevant rectangles in Figure 2, those that involved tariff revenue in the case of own protection,
but that now represent the expected increase in the cost of imports relative to full market access.   Comparison
of equations (14) and (18) shows that, in the present context, the variance component of expected
interventions accounts for a relatively more important share of the welfare impact of own liberalization than it
does in the case of improved market access. This is because, in the case of market access, the expected
deterioration in market access conditions relative to free access enters not only in terms of the dead weight loss
triangle (resource allocation effects), but also in terms of the expected increase in the cost of actual imports. 
C. possible generalizations
The formal analysis offered in this paper has been stylized, incorporating the simplifying assumptions of a
single price-based instrument for which the underlying probability distribution is invariant to changes in
bindings.  Generalizing the analysis across instruments and/or sectors would obviously require relaxation of
this assumption.  While this is well beyond the basic thrust of the paper, it merits some discussion here. 
It should be straightforward, in principle, to generalize the analysis to cases where the distribution
changes in response to changes in bindings.  In some cases, the mean level of protection through a particular
instrument might increase when the binding on that instrument is reduced, in an attempt to offset the effect of
the reduction in the binding. In other cases, a reduction in a binding might reduce the profitability of rent-
seeking behavior enough to lower the mean of the underlying distribution.  (One would expect that, in most
cases, these impacts will be second-order relative to those that are highlighted here, such that liberalizations are
not 100 percent offset.)
More significant is the possibility of the interaction of bindings with the distribution of protection
across instruments and sectors. In most of this paper we treat t  as a single price instrument, applied in a single
market. However, the basic point summarized by equations (13), (14), and (15) is more general: that the mean
cost of protection is determined by the probability density function surrounding the protection term t . One
could also interpret t  as a vector of instruments applied over a set of markets, where the cost of protection then
depends on the probability density function (including covariance terms) for the full vector of instruments. The
binding term b can then be interpreted as a vector of instrument caps.
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If we assume we are working with a vector of policy instruments linked across sectors, then the cost of
protection becomes a multi-market measure, rather than a single market measure.  This is consistent with our
general equilibrium approach to modelling the issue.  Equation (11) is sufficiently general to allow for any
number of trade distortions, and the expected cost of protection may be  measured by a multivariate extension
of equation (14). In the multivariate context, the cost of protection is given (to a second-order approximation)
by a quadratic form in t : Taking expectations of this quadratic form leads to the multivariate version of
equation (14):
(19) E B E Z TR Zpp pp( ) ( ) ( )D S= - ¢ = -
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where Zpp is the matrix of compensated price effects contained in the behavioral model, and S  is the variance-
covariance matrix of second moments about the origin of the different protective instruments.
It is also theoretically possible to extend the analysis still further and incorporate endogenous
responses of the distribution of protection within a multiple-market, multiple-instrument analysis.  Such a fully
general analysis would need to allow for the possibility of instrument-switching as discussed by Martin and
Francois (1997), where the impact of one instrument is offset by endogenously-determined changes in another.
Undertaking a completely general, multiple-market, multiple-instrument empirical evaluation of the impacts of
bindings would be problematic at best, given our basic uncertainties about which general class of political-
economy models is the most appropriate for explaining the choice of particular policy instruments.  However,
as a modest step toward assessing the possible magnitude of the effects under consideration, we turn in the
next section to a relatively simple stylized assessment for three major commodities of the impact of an
important area of trade reform under the Uruguay Round -- the introduction of tariff bindings on agricultural
commodities.
VII. An illustration: Uruguay Round agricultural bindings
A typical operational approach to assessing the liberalizing effects of the introduction of a new
binding, or a reduction in an existing binding, is to take the marginal impact of the binding to be zero if the
final binding is above the initial applied rate, and to be unity if it is below the initial applied rate.  It should now
be clear that this approach completely ignores the effects of tariff bindings above the mean.   Less obviously, it
tends to overstate the marginal impact of reductions in bindings occurring at or below the initial applied rate. 
Our objective in this section is to illustrate the concepts we have developed here through a stylized application
to agricultural bindings undertaken during the Uruguay Round.
Because of the complexities and uncertainties inherent in the full multivariate case, we elect to focus
on individual commodities and countries in this application. Since we would normally expect bindings on one
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commodity to reduce the pressure for protection from related industries9, we feel that the single-commodity
analysis presented below will underestimate the gains associated with the extensive tariffication undertaken
during the Uruguay Round.  It will, at the same time, raise the lower-bound estimate above that reached by
current methods. In a global analysis, terms of trade and second-best effects of changes in world prices must
also be considered.  These are excluded in the present exercise in order to allow us to focus on illustration of
the direct effects of primary interest.  (However this could be included in a large scale numerical analysis.)
Under the Uruguay Round agricultural agreement, developed countries are required to establish tariff
bindings for previously unbound agricultural products with a protective effect equal to the combined effects of
tariffs and nontariff barriers in a base period (1986-88), and to subsequently reduce them by an average of 36
percent in developed countries (24 percent in developing countries) and by at least 15 percent (10 percent in
developing countries) for each tariff line.  As detailed in Table 2, tariffication affected roughly 13 percent of
agricultural trade by value, though it was concentrated in the most heavily protected sectors.  Its implications
for potential welfare effects are therefore greater than suggested by the trade weights.  Sectors subject to
tariffication include wheat, sugar, meat, and dairy products.  The procedures used to estimate the protective
effects of nontariff barriers allowed considerable scope for discretion.10  As a result, many of the new tariff
bindings in developed and developing countries for products subject to tariffication will be set above their
levels in the reference period. This means that many of the tariff cuts in Table 2 are from elevated levels. 
Developing countries also had the option to set their tariff bindings even higher through the use of ceiling
bindings (Hathaway and Ingco, 1996).  Hence, even for sectors not subject to tariffication, developing countries
often entered tariff bindings significantly above applied rates.
In this situation, simple approaches to evaluating the liberalizing effects of agricultural tariff bindings
are likely to tell us very little. If the tariff bindings are simply compared with the previously applied rates of
protection, it may even appear that the agreement has resulted in an increase in protection.  A standard
approach is to compare applied rate to bindings, and assume changes occur only if the new bindings are below
old applied rates.  (See, for example,  Francois et al, 1996).  Under this approach, the estimated extent of
liberalization is likely to be extremely small, as is evident from Hathaway and Ingco’s (1996) analysis.
The approach we take here is to estimate the mean and variance of the underlying distribution of
protection, and to evaluate the impact of bindings on the mean level and cost of protection.  Comparison of the
mean level of protection with the mean of the data during the sample period provides an initial indication of the
extent of expected liberalization.  We use data calculated by the OECD for the annual ad valorem equivalents of
                                                  
9 This is particularly likely to be the case where goods are related vertically or horizontally in production. More
generally, increases in protection to one industry tend to provide a positive signal to protectionist lobbies, and to
stimulate protectionist pressures.
10 The tariff equivalents were generally to be calculated at the 4-digit level of the Harmonized System, while tariffs
are applied at the individual national tariff line level, which may involve 10 or 12 digits.
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agricultural trade barriers in OECD countries (OECD 1994) made available on diskette by the Agriculture
Directorate of the OECD. These data are available over the period 1979-93, providing a sample large enough
to make a rough calculation of the standard deviation of protection for each commodity under the policy
regime applying during this period. For illustrative purposes, our calculations are based on the assumption that
the mean and variance of protection over the 1979-93 period would continue to apply in the future in the
absence of a tariff binding.11  Where Uruguay Round tariff bindings were made in specific terms, they have
been converted to ad valorem equivalents using World Bank commodity price projections.
We take the world price of the good as exogenous to each individual country, and the rate of
protection as distributed independently of this world price. In a short run context of sticky internal prices, it is
clear that the protection rate is not completely independent of the world price on a year to year basis.  In fact,
once the domestic price is set for a season under arrangements such as the European Union’s variable levy
system, the protection rate and the world price are perfectly negatively correlated. Over the longer term,
however, there is evidence that domestic prices tend to follow world prices of agricultural products, except for a
stochastic margin term that includes the effects of protection policy (Mundlak and Larson, 1992).12
We assume that the moments of the process generating the distribution of protection remain constant
after the introduction of bindings. That is, we assume that the fundamental determinants of the supply of and
demand for protection do not change because of the introduction of tariff bindings, and that basically the same
instruments continue to be used to determine the rate of protection below the constraint imposed by the
binding. In some important cases, such as EU agricultural policy, the same general instruments for border
protection will continue to be employed, subject to the constraint imposed by  the GATT tariff bindings
(Josling and Tangermann, 1994). Even if the specific instruments utilized do change, it seems reasonable to
assume, as a general rule, that protection will still vary in similar ways, since the fundamental stochastic
determinants of protection remain in place.
                                                  
11This assumption is clearly important. If protection rates are increasing, then this assumption may understate the
degree of liberalization which has been achieved. Importantly, we also assume that the balance between those
seeking and resisting protection will be unchanged by the presence of a binding. If, however, both parties are fully
rational in their understanding of the system, it is possible that the suppliers and demanders of protection would
understand that a higher level of protection during unbound periods is required to achieve any given level of
average protection. In this super-rational case, our results may overstate the degree of liberalization actually
achieved.
12 As a check on the robustness of our results, we calculated the correlation between the world price and the protection
rate using our sample. In general, these correlations were very small, suggesting that the lack of independence between the
world price and the protection rate would not significantly affect the estimate of the variance. Had the correlations been
significant, we could very simply have adjusted our procedures to obtain an estimate of the variance of the protection rate
conditional on our projection of the world price.  Given a predicted value for the world price, the conditional
variance of the protection rate is: 2 2s o rt t|p
2= (1- ) , where r is the correlation between the world price and the
protection rate (Freund and Walpole 1980).  If the mean over the forecast period were expected to deviate from its
underlying mean, then and adjustment to the conditional mean of the distribution of protection would also be
required before the impact of the binding on protection could be evaluated.
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Importantly, we assume that the mean of the distribution of protection rates will not merely be
increased to fully compensate for the introduction of a binding. While possible, such a reaction would seem to
require more knowledge of the system, and a greater degree of co-ordination between suppliers and demanders
of protection than would seem generally likely. If individual industries were able to counter GATT rules so
easily, then presumably they could block the entire GATT process of protection reduction, an assumption
contradicted by the success experienced by the GATT in lowering protection rates on the goods which it has
systematically covered -- manufactured goods imported by industrial countries.
We provide an illustrative application for three important agricultural commodities (wheat, sugar, and
beef) in seven OECD countries for which ad valorem measures of the final tariff bindings resulting from the
Uruguay Round are available from analysis undertaken by Ingco (1996). In most cases, the tariff commitments
have been made in specific terms, and these ad valorem equivalents have been calculated using 1989-93 average
prices as an indicator of likely future prices. An exception is the protection estimates for  wheat and sugar in the
EU and Japan, where the ad valorem bindings are based on World Bank commodity price projections for the
year 2000.  We discuss all of the protection measures in terms of import protection, even for exporting
countries, since import restrictions are an essential backstop for export subsidy programs.
In Table 3, we provide estimates of the mean and the standard deviation of protection prior to the
Round in the first and second columns. In the third column, we show the estimated ad valorem equivalent of
the tariff binding. Then, in the fourth and fifth columns, we provide estimates of the mean and standard
deviation of (bound) protection applying after the Round. The final column shows the relative reduction in the
expected cost of protection resulting from the introduction of the binding, calculated using equation (12).
The results for wheat presented in the first section of Table 3 highlight the very substantial variation
across regions and across time in the rates of border protection applying to wheat. Further, it is clear that the
final bindings are above the average rates of protection applying in the pre-Round era, despite the commitment
in the Round to lower protection relative to previous average levels. Does this imply that the Uruguay Round 
"liberalization " actually resulted in increases in protection rates? Clearly not. When we look at the mean
protection rates in the final column of the table, it is clear that even these generally high bindings can be
expected to lead to some liberalization in some major markets. This liberalization is particularly important in
Japan, where the expected cost of protection declines by 287 percentage points from the 1979-93 average.
Another important feature of the results for wheat is the decline in the standard deviation of protection
resulting from the introduction of tariff bindings. In the EU, the reduction in the variability of protection is
greater than in the mean, implying that most of the gains are derived from the reduction in variability, rather
than from the reduction in the average rate of protection. In the case of the United States, the mean falls by
much more than the standard deviation of protection falls, implying that the reduction in average protection is
more important than the reduction in the variability of protection.  In other cases, such as Japan, the reduction
in the standard deviation is much larger than that in the mean, implying that the reduction in the variability of
-20-
protection is the dominant influence in reducing the welfare costs of protection. In this case, so much of the
probability mass is concentrated at the binding that it effectively becomes a deterministic rate of protection.
A striking feature of the results is just how large are the reductions in the costs of protection resulting
from the introduction of bindings on wheat, despite the frequently substantial slippage in the settings of the
bindings relative to the objectives of the Round.  The size of these reductions highlights the very large gains
associated with initial reductions in rates of protection, and the importance of measuring the effects on both the
mean and the variability of protection.  To illustrate this point, Figure 3 presents a decomposition of the source
of estimated reductions in the cost of protection, into the share attributable to mean reduction, and the share
attributable to variance reduction.  As suggested by Table 3, the relative importance of mean and variance
reduction varies by country.  Measures of protection which are based on methods like equation (13), and which
therefore focus only on the reduction in observed protection, will only capture reductions related to the mean
rate.  As is evident from Figure 3 (particularly Canada, Australia and the United States), such an approach can
miss important liberalizing aspects of rules limiting the rate of protection.
The estimates of the impact of sugar market liberalization in the central section of Table 3 present a
somewhat more diverse pattern than the results for wheat.  In Japan, the binding itself virtually determines the
expected rate of protection after the Round.  The final binding is so far to the left of the underlying mean rate
of protection that virtually all of the probability mass is collected at the bound rate. The cost of protecting sugar
in Japan is reduced by 94 percent because of the sharp reduction in both the mean and the variability of
protection. The reduction in the standard deviation of protection is almost twenty-fold and contributes much
more than the reduction in average protection to the overall reduction in costs.  The binding offered by the
USA, at 91 percent, reduces the average rate of protection and the standard deviation by broadly similar
amounts. Even though the tariff binding is only seven percentage points below the underlying average tariff
rate, the mean tariff is reduced by 32 percentage points, and the standard deviation of protection is almost
halved, with the costs of protection falling by 60 percent. In the EU, the cost of protection is reduced by an
estimated 43 percent even though the binding is above the previous mean level of protection.
The case of beef is quite different from that of sugar and wheat, primarily because the standard
deviation of protection is much lower for this commodity than for wheat or sugar.  In part because of this, and
in part because of the setting of the protection rates, bindings above the average tariff rate do not have a
substantial liberalizing effect in any country other than Japan. In Japan, the binding is below the average rate of
protection and reduces both the mean and the standard deviation of protection substantially. Since the
proportional reduction in the variability of protection is larger, this reduction contributes most of the 60 percent
reduction in the costs of protection estimated in this case.
-21-
VIII. Summary and conclusions
A key feature of multilateral liberalizations has been the introduction of tariff bindings which constrain
the range and variability of protection rates. While tariff bindings allow tariff rates to vary below the level of the
binding, they reduce both the average applied tariff and the variability of the applied rate of protection. 
Drawing on the extensive literature on the political economy of protection for support, we have argued that
protection rates can vary in response to a wide range of pressures for protection, and that these pressures are
likely to continue to generate varying rates of protection even after the introduction of new tariff bindings.
Accordingly, we characterize trade policy in the presence of a tariff binding as generating uncertain rates of
protection subject to the limit imposed by the binding. Under this assumption, we assess the effect of a tariff
binding on the mean and the standard deviation of protection.
As a basis for evaluating the liberalization of stochastically varying protection, we develop a conceptual
framework based on the expected cost of protection.  In our basic set of examples, involving a single price-
based instrument, this cost can be shown to depend on the second moment of protection about the origin (or,
equivalently, the sum of the squared mean and the variance of protection) and the slope of the import demand
function. This approach highlights the fact that the cost of protection rises with the square of the rate and the
standard deviation of the rate of protection.  Within this conceptual framework, we discuss the possibility of
assessing the relative impact of tariff bindings on the total costs of protection for individual commodities,
through calculation of welfare-weighted cost of protection indexes.
Finally, as illustration we have provided examples, based on such indexes, for the effect of tariff
bindings on imports of three important commodities: wheat, sugar and beef.  Even though tariff bindings on
these commodities were typically set at levels substantially higher than the average rates of protection previously
applied, it seems likely that the introduction of tariff bindings will yield substantial reductions in the costs of
protection on a broad range of these commodities.
The analytical approach followed here has also allowed us to provide a formal representation of the
concept of “improved market access” following from tariff bindings.  This is the basic objective of trade
negotiations (with zero tariffs being a subset of bound tariffs), and so in our view it merits formal analysis.  We
have shown that improved market access, in terms of reduced terms of trade uncertainty related to export
market protection, has welfare implications that follow not only from the expected level of market access, but
also to the stability of those conditions of access.
A basic objective of this paper has been to push the notion of protection away from one based
primarily on fixed policy instruments, closer to one that involves policy regimes subject to uncertainty and
variability.  While the importance of the security and certainty of market access has long been recognized in the
policy process, little attention has been devoted to these issues in the formal economics literature.  As has been
demonstrated, the stochastic aspect of policy variables can have important implications for the effects of
negotiated bindings and rules-based policy constraints, beyond those suggested in frameworks built around
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fixed policy regimes. This implies that the near-universal omission of the beneficial impacts of the improved
stability of market access in studies of multilateral liberalization may have greatly understated the gains from the
process.  Further research is needed not only on rules-based liberalization and the distribution of protection for
particular sectors and regions, but also on the impact of bindings given linkages in the distribution of protection
across instruments and sectors.  In addition, it should also be evident that reductions in the uncertainty that
characterizes the commercial policy landscape could have significant effects related to the size and allocation of
the capital stock, suggesting a second line of potentially useful research.
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Figure 3
The Expected Cost of Protection for Wheat
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Table 1.           Trade-weighted structure of Mexican tariffs, 1982-1991
Imports (US $ million)
tariff rates 1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  
duty-free    3075.1  3174.2  3586.7  368.2  3004.5  4836.9  7664.4  4893.4  5172.2  5771.9  
2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0 .0  0.0  
5  1458.1  793.6  1135.3  1487.2  0.0  823.6  1537.8  247.1  290.3  388.8  
10  5312.8  2853.7  4229.7  3269.7  3556.6  1452.2  1415.0  6979.0  7630.1  11531.5  
15  216.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  2102.2  3085.4  4205.7  6954.1  
17.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  18.5  742.8  0.0  0.0  0 .0  0.0  
20  1761.3  206  231.1  129.8  6.6  0.0  1861.2  2999.2  4266.0  6078.6  
22.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  1347.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0 .0  0.0  
25  375.4  290  492.3  1522.7  120.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0 .0  0.0  
27.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  25.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0 .0  0.0  
30  433.1  7.6  10.0  118  22.2  0.0  0.0  0.0  0 .0  0.0  
35  28.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0 .0  0.0  
37  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  954.8  0.0  0.0  0.0  0 .0     0.0  
40  462.0  190.8  211.0  1133.1  4.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  0 .0  0.0  
45  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  394.9  0.0    0.0  0.0  0 .0  0.0  
50  534.2  22.9  70.3  365.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0 .0  0.0  
60  115.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0 .0  0.0  
70  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0 .0  0.0  
75  173.2  30.5  10.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0 .0  0.0  
80  14.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0 .0  0.0  
100  476.4  61.0  70.3  94.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0 .0  0.0  
        
  total imports 14437.0  7630.3  10046.8  8489.0  9456.2  7855.5  14580.6  18204.1  21564.3  30724.9  
  imports dutied
  over 50%
1313.7  114.4  150.7  460.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0   0.0  
  
  weight
  average duty
16.4  8.0  8.5  18.5  13.1  4.0  6.2  9.7  10.5  11.2  
source:  GATT(1993), Table IV.3.  
Trade levels exclude imports subject to variable specific duties, which are only relevant for 1991,
and covered less than 1 percent of imports.
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Table 2. Bindings, tariff reductions, and tariffications in the Uruguay Round 
agriculture agreement (imports in millions of dollars)
Scope of bindings            Profile of Tariff Reductions            Scope of
Tariffication
Reporter country
   
Total
imports
Pre-Round Post-
Round
0.0% 0.1-9.9% 10.0 -
14.9%
15.0 - 24%24.1 - 36% > 36%
Australia    1,009 474 1,009 0 0 0 213 59 599 83
Austria      864 648 864 0 0 0 146 240 304 108
Brazil       888 320 888 327 17 271 50 62 109 0
Canada       2,065 2,024 2,065 0 0 0 298 439 295 239
Czech Republic 1,278 1,266 1,278 15 0 24 224 32 342 92
European Union 32,728 29,455 32,728 0 0 0 4,759 6,874 5,697 6,100
Finland      588 494 588 0 0 9 128 67 235 105
Hong Kong    8,419 253 8,419 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Hungary      751 308 751 0 0 0 211 250 108 377
India        1,630 326 1,630 1,221 0 0 0 101 38 0
Indonesia    1,313 906 1,313 0 0 996 195 45 77 68
Jamaica      192 0 192 105 0 0 0 0 0 0
Japan        25,970 15,582 25,970 8 6 1,420 6,736 485 5,973 1,868
Korea Rep.   4,598 1,103 4,598 1 2 1,450 260 272 2,604 850
Macao        232 0 232 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Malaysia     932 37 932 53 0 123 207 240 128 34
Mexico       2,740 2,740 2,740 0 137 1,911 22 532 88 743
New Zealand  293 225 293 0 0 0 16 43 97 0
Norway       512 476 512 0 0 0 68 187 43 252
Philippines  1,079 313 1,079 7 0 130 64 290 588 251
Poland       1,490 0 1,490 0 0 0 86 502 706 694
Romania      871 200 871 0 2 200 368 52 249 59
Singapore    2,103 21 2,103 0 0 0 449 23 1,612 0
Slovak Rep.  1,278 1,266 1,278 15 0 24 224 32 342 92
Sri Lanka    522 78 522 80 0 0 442 0 0 0
Sweden       1,194 1,015 1,194 0 0 0 185 114 117 299
Switzerland  1,351 972 1,351 0 12 27 298 420 304 484
Thailand     1,048 189 1,048 0 0 825 15 58 119 189
Tunisia      616 0 616 0 0 1 296 255 64 290
Turkey       1,093 109 1,093 0 0 497 360 18 218 0
United States 17,555 16,501 17,555 410 212 1,628 3,119 2,265 4,426 1,052
Venezuela    646 646 646 0 21 446 127 0 52 507
Total 117,848 77,948 117,848 2,241 410 9,982 19,568 13,956 25,531 14,835
Shares 1.00 0.66 1.00 0.02 0.00 0.08 0.17 0.12 0.22 0.13
Source:  GATT/WTO secretariat. Data are for Harmonized System (HS6) participants.
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Table 3. Implications of Uruguay Round agricultural bindings
Mean 79-93 Std DeviationFinal Binding New Mean New Std Dev.Cost Reduction
% % % % % %
   Wheat
EU 56 37 82 51 30 24
US 12 14 4 1 6 90
Japan 438 153 152 151 14 89
Canada 22 18 58 22 18 3
Norway 170 126 495 170 126 0
Australia 0 1 0 0 1 76
Turkey 13 29 200 13 29 0
   Sugar
EU 149 80 152 118 48 43
US 98 70 91 66 39 60
Japan 227 74 58 58 4 94
Canada 8 3 35 8 3 2
Norway 0 0 211 0 0 0
Australia 7 7 52 7 7 0
Turkey 17 30 150 17 30 0
   Beef
EU 84 16 125 84 16 0
US 2 2 31 2 2 0
Japan 54 21 39 36 7 61
Canada 2 2 38 2 2 0
Norway 146 25 405 146 25 0
Australia 0 0 0 0 0 0
Turkey 28 29 250 28 29 0
Note: numbers have been rounded to the nearest percent.
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